Introduction
Legal monism, the theory of positive law in which the State legal order is a partial legal order of international law, finds its most sustained initial formulation in the work of Hans Kelsen. Kelsen's legal monism is, however, conventionally regarded as having been rendered of marginal significance with the establishment of the United Nations after the end of World War II. In the conventional interpretation, Kelsen's legal monism is rendered historical in a double sense. First, it is marked as a theoretical project which is essentially associated with the inter-War period; and, secondly, this association renders Kelsen's theory of merely historical interest, and thereby consigned to the domain of the history of ideas or the history of legal philosophy. 1 The marginalisation of Kelsen's legal monism is reinforced by the continuing presence, within the historical accounts of international relations during the 1920s, of a perspective in which "[t]he 1920s were an anomaly and an interlude, a pause on the road to depression and dictatorship and a brief truce in the century of total war. The decade of peace was an era of illusions". 2 Hence, when placed within this interpretative context, Kelsen's theoretical project to elaborate a theory of positive law, in which the primacy of the State legal order is displaced by the primacy of international law, becomes a reflection of this anomalous decade.
This article proposes an alternative understanding of the historical importance of Kelsen's theory of legal monism. It commences from recent historical scholarship concerned with international relations of the 1920s, much of which has sought to detach this decade from its retrospective interpretation as the mere prelude to the Second World War. 3 This reinterpretation has been undertaken by revealing both the fluidity and openness of possibilities
